March of the British on Delhi page 2

While these blows were parried in their rear, the army before Delhi had made good its position. It was strong and defensible. To the north of Delhi, some two miles, there is a sandstone ridge, running nearly parallel to the course of the Jumna - that is, north-north-east. The slope from the city walls is gradual, but somewhat broken. The plateau on the summit is tolerably flat, and along the whole course of the ridge, but well in rear - that is, north of it - lay the lines of the camp. The ridge, in fact, may be roughly described as the right bank of the Jumna, to which it approaches at its northern, and from which it recedes at its southern, end. This was the position of the besieging army. Its left rested on the ridge near the river; its centre was behind the Flagstaff Tower, so often mentioned; its right at the butt end of the ridge, where the ground fell rapidly towards the Subzee Mundi and Kishengunge, suburbs of Delhi, facing its western walls, and set in gardens and groves. At this end the ridge was crowned by a house formerly belonging to a Mahratta chief, and called the Hindoo Rao's house; and here we quickly established a battery, and made a strong post to defend that side. The grand trunk road to Loodiana and Lahore, going from the Cashmere Gate, ascended the ridge, and crossed it to the east of the Flagstaff, and a good road ran along the interior of the ridge parallel to it, thus tying together the position. From this ridge, but especially from the Hindoo Rao's house, Delhi was visible, standing up bold and distinct in the clear air, with its stout red walls and bastions, and white buildings embowered in trees. Between the ridge and the city the ground was rugged, and dotted all over with houses, mosques, tombs, and ruins, rising up among clumps of trees. Such was the base of our attack; for on the south, the whole of the country, as far as Agra, was in the hands of the enemy; the river protected the eastern face, and we had no choice but to assail the north.

As soon as the force settled down on the ridge, the enemy commenced a series of attacks, which may be described as incessant. This was good policy, for it harassed the besiegers, and kept the Sepoys in good heart, although they were invariably beaten. The first of these was on the 9th. They issued from the Lahore Gate on the west, covered by a cannonade from the Moree bastion, at the north-western angle, and, moving on the right flank of the position, strove to storm the ridge. But in vain. The Guides, coming up to support the Rifles and Ghoorkas, charged so vigorously, that the Sepoys were driven up to the very walls with great loss. It was here that Quentin Battye, in his first fight, received his death wound. Mourned by all, he expired four days afterwards, murmuring the words of the famous Roman poet - "Dulce et decorum est pro patria inori. (It is a sweet and becoming thing to die for one's country.") On the 10th and the 11th the mutineers sent up fresh men to turn and carry the right, and paid heavily for their temerity. The heavy guns were now in battery on a knoll forming part of the garden of the Hindoo Rao's house, but their fire was not sufficient to silence, barely to cope with, that of the enemy from his bastions. Our officers began to respect the rebel artillerymen, whose guns were so accurately laid, that some could only account for it by supposing that there were European deserters in their ranks. On the 12th the enemy, tired of trying the right, fell adroitly and unexpectedly on the left. There in front and due east of the Flagstaff, stood the house and grounds of Sir T. Metcalfe, just where the fertile soil ended and the sands of the Jumna begin. The house had been wrecked and the grounds despoiled of their beauty by the Goojurs, but its trees and coyer, and the ravines between it and the ridge, rendered it a good military post. Here the mutineers had established a garrison and a battery; and from this, on the morning of the 12th, they pushed out a large force, which by stealthy movements actually approached within musket- ßhot of the Flagstaff, without being detected. There were a few of the 75th and two guns in position. The Sepoys turned its flank, and, pressing vigorously forward, gained the ridge, and even crossed it. Captain Keith Was killed. The guns were in danger. For a moment the whole of that side was in extreme peril; but the 75th soon rallied, and the guns began to play. Then supports came up - 1st Fusiliers, Guides, Rifles. A steady charge was made, and the enemy, cut up and bayonetted, rolled down the hill. The charge. became eager. The pursued went fast, but the pursuers were almost as speedy; and, seeing the opportunity, chased the men into and out of Metcalfe's house, and up to the walls of Delhi. Thus won, this advanced post was held and made the most of, completely barring the way to any force directed on our left, and placing us so far nearer Delhi. This sharp onset had no sooner been repulsed, than the enemy showed himself on the right. It was a clumsy attempt at a combined attack on both flanks. Issuing from the Subzee Mundi, on our right rear, the Sepoys made a fruitless effort to mount the hill. The Ghoorkas and Rifles on picket, and part of the 1st Fusiliers, met them, drove them back, and chased them out of the enclosures, killing a goodly number. No quarter was given, The loss, inflicted on them in these fights was estimated at 400 killed.

On the 11th four young officers,. Hodson, Wilberforce Greathed, Chesney, and Maunsell, were directed to sit in council, and draw up a plan showing how they would take Delhi out of hand. Their plan was simple enough. They proposed that all the infantry available, some 1,800 mens should move at midnight down to the walls, blow in two gates with powder bags, and, storming in, surprise and capture the place. The general took the plan, considered it, adopted it, and issued his orders. The thing was to be done on the night of the 12th, on the heels of the repulse inflicted that day. The young men were sanguine of success, and eager to try - none more so than Hodson. Part of the troops marched; they reached their stations, then halted and reconnoitred: all was still; but the remainder did not arrive; instead of the remainder, came an order to retire. Brigadier Graves had refused to believe that the general intended to leave the camp in charge of native troops and horsemen; and in place of sending his infantry, went himself to remonstrate with Sir Henry Barnard. The brigadier admitted readily that the city could be taken, but doubted whether it could be held. Sir Henry hesitated, time was lost, and so he gave way. The conduct of the brigadier is described both by Hodson and Norman as a " mistake of orders." This mistake was bitterly censured at the time, but we cannot help agreeing with those who are thankful for the delay, since even success would have saved no one from massacre, and would have sent a horde of armed ruffians pouring down the unprotected south road; whereas for three months Delhi served as a rallying place, and the Sepoys were kept together.

Unsuspicious of the danger hanging over them, the enemy were still full of fight, and encounters, more or less sharp, continued every day. The front and flanks of the position were now more strongly secured, as it was plain that Delhi could not be taken until large reinforcements of infantry, more guns, and especially more gunners, arrived. Major Reid held the Hindoo Rao's house with his Ghoorkas, commanding Kishengunge and protecting the batteries. Major Tombs had charge of a post to -the right rear, over against the Subzee Mundi, The whole front was strengthened by entrenchments, and Hodson kept both eyes on the rear. Head of. the intelligence department, he was served by a " one-eyed moulvie, " once the confidential native secretary of Sir Henry Lawrence, and through Rujjub Ali, Hodson learnt what was done in the city as well as elsewhere; for the moulvie betook himself to Delhi, and thence every day, says Mr. Cave Browne, did he "daily forward, in a quill, a chupattie, the sole of a shoe, the fold of a turban, the matted hair of a Sikh, anywhere or anyhow, so as to escape detection - a slip Of paper," containing the news of the day. Thus, our gallant handful kept watch and ward.

But they were not content to stand still and repel attacks. Few though they were, they could show their teeth on occasions. On the 17th the enemy, under cover of a very severe cannonade, threw a large force on to a hill near the Eedgah, a walled enclosure, and there began to work on a battery, which, when finished, would enfilade the position on the ridge. Sir Henry Barnard determined to stop this dangerous move; in the afternoon he formed two columns, one under Major Reid, the other under Major Tombs. Starting from our right flank, Reid pushed straight through Kishengunge, and emerged on the right of the new rebel battery, while Tombs, having made a detour, fell upon their left. The new battery was soon carried; the magazine blown up; the mutineers were hunted from garden to garden; the doors of four serais were destroyed, and one gun was carried off by the gallant Tombs. The enemy lost about 300 killed and wounded. Considering the nature of the country, our loss, was trifling - three killed and twelve wounded.

The rebels, however, now received a large reinforcement. The brigade which had mutinied at Nusseerabad, in Scindia's country, on the 28th of May, entered Delhi on the 17th, and on the 19th they were sent out to fight their old masters. Their tactics were new. They resolved to operate strategically, and cut us off from the Punjab. With this object they marched out with much ostentation at mid-day, filing bravely through the Lahore Gate, traversing Kishengunge, and disappearing from view to the westward. The movement had been, of course, observed by Reid and Tombs, and the whole force turned out, but they turned in again when the Sepoys vanished from view. But late in the afternoon news came in from the rear that the Sepoys had worked round, and were in position across the great road. This was most serious. Colonel Hope Grant could only oppose them with seven troops of British cavalry, and the Guides and twelve guns. Although the odds were so great against them - 3,000 to about 350 - Grant did not hesitate to attack. The guns, under Turner, Tombs, and Bishop, went rapidly into action. The cavalry, under Yule and Daly, of the Guides, charged with headlong gallantry as often as opportunities presented themselves. Right and left the mutineers were checked, by lance and sabre, and cannon, until night drew near. But the rebel infantry worked through the inclosures, and fired on our gunners, while their artillery, splendidly served, did considerable execution. Our cavalry and guns were obliged to fall back before the masses crowding in upon them on all sides, when 300 infantry from the camp reached the field. Yule had fallen dead; the Guides had brought off Daly wounded; two guns were in the hands of the Sepoys. At this moment our foot, Rifles and Fusiliers, went in with the bayonet, and in a few moments the tide of rebel success was arrested, and the guns won back. Night had fallen; the enemy retreated, covering himself with a random fire in the dark, and the action was over.

The next morning Colonel Grant rode on to the field with his horse, and found it abandoned; dead men and horses lying about, and a 9-pounder deserted, which he brought in. Soon came a fresh alarm. The enemy had returned to renew the combat. He brought up his guns - the famous Jellalabad battery, part of the "illustrious" garrison - and his round shot rolled through the camp. But his triumph was short. Sweeping down with every available bayonet, Brigadier Wilson closed with the rebels, and swiftly drove them away. They hurried off, carrying away their guns, and, having had enough of strategy, returned by a roundabout march to Delhi. It was a critical moment in the history of the siege. We were triumphant, but our little force was diminished by 100 men killed and wounded. Colonel Becher, Quartermaster-General, was among the wounded, and Hope Grant had his horse shot under him, and owed his life to two men of the Lancers and two orderly troopers of the 4th Irregular Cavalry. Precautions were now taken to guard the rear as effectually as the small- ness of the force would permit. On the very day of the first attack, Captain M'Andrew, acting on a mere rumour of an attack, had drawn off the force guarding Bhagput Bridge over the Jumna, and Hodson was obliged to ride thither and restore this line of communication with Meerut. M'Andrew was deservedly censured for running away without even seeing an enemy.

On the 21st, the Jhullundhur Brigade - the reader will remember how Mr. Ricketts fought with it on the Sutlej - augmented by the 3rd Native Infantry, picked up at Philour, entered Delhi. The rebels were now so numerous that they encamped outside the place, but out of our reach, and under their own guns. On the 23rd, 850 men, including Rothney's 4th Sikhs, arrived in the British camp. It was a timely succour. The 23rd of June was the anniversary of Plassey. For 100 years the British "raj" had endured. Now crazy, or wily, pundits and moulvies brought to light a prediction that, on the 23rd of June, 1857, British rule would end. So the Delhi garrison moved out in great excitement to fulfil the prophecy. They paid for it, and dearly. Crowding into the Subzee Mundi, and bringing guns up to the Eedgah, they raked the right flank with the latter, and skirmished up the slope with their infantry. These attacks were easily repulsed, but the artillery fire was very destructive; and Brigadier Showers begged Sir Henry Barnard to assume the offensive. He assented. The first attacks failed, with the loss of two officers and several men. Then the column was reinforced. The 4th Sikhs, and part of the 2nd Fusiliers, just in from a march of twenty-two miles, went gaily into action, and, using the bayonet very freely, rapidly cleared the Subzee Mundi, killing great numbers of rebels, who had shut themselves up in a temple called the " Sammy House," and forcing the remainder to fly, galled by the fire of our batteries on the ridge. This action gave us the Subzee Mundi, which we occupied, connecting it by a breastwork with the ridge, thus securing the position on that side; but it cost us thirty-eight killed and 118 wounded to prove to the Sepoys that our " raj " had not yet come to an end.

Thus the position of the British before Delhi became gradually more extensive, stretching now from the Subzee Mundi to Metcalfe's house, and thus commanding both roads leading to our rear. Neville Chamberlain arrived to act as adjutant-general. " He," writes Hodson, "ought to be worth a thousand men to us." Then came further reinforcements: half the 8th Foot, a hundred European artillerymen, and many score old Sikh gunners who had served at Sobraon - raised by Mr. Barnes - a battery, and the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, bringing up the force present to about 6,600 men of all arms. This was the force destined to hold on to that ridge, and two months afterwards, when aided by John Nicholson, to rush into Delhi. But now we must leave these heroes for a time, to track the bloody steps of mutiny on the Ganges and Jumna.