Chapter XXXVII, of Cassells Illustrated History of England, Volume 9 page 3

In England the news of the fall of the Empire and the revolution of the 4th September was received with mixed feelings. A very general opinion prevailed that the Emperor had been overtaken by a just retribution, though this feeling was qualified by the recollection of the real friendliness which Napoleon had invariably manifested towards this country, and in which his sincerity cannot be doubted. With regard to any change which the revolution just consummated might make in the position of France, and in the duties of the neutral Powers in her regard, the Government of Mr. Gladstone gave no indication of a belief that, either now or hereafter, interference (unless Belgium were attacked) could become the duty or the interest of England. France might be crushed, devastated, dismembered; but England, governed by the commercial masses, for which no political consideration that is not based on the interests of trade has any real force or value, was resolved to look on calmly to the end. But, as far as words went, the Provisional Government had no reason to complain of any lack of cordiality. Our Ambassador, Lord Lyons, was the first of all the foreign representatives to call on M. Jules Favre at the Foreign Office on the morning of the 5th September. Lord Lyons was full of good will. He reminded the minister that his Government had offered its mediation to France, which had refused it. He could not conceal that public opinion in England was still hostile to France, and that the mind of the Queen was strongly acted upon, by the influence of relationship in favour of Germany. Yet it was possible that, in the course of events, the feeling in England might change; and that a sense of common interest might, if Germany pushed her successes too far and too unscrupulously, make the majority of Englishmen think that of two evils intervention was the least. In reply, M. Jules Favre, after laying great stress on the circumstance that the Imperial Government which rashly began the war had been overthrown, and that the party now in power had from the first been opposed to war, enlarged on those considerations which seemed to him to prove that England had a manifest interest in interfering to prevent France from being seriously weakened. England, he thought, would sink in reputation, and lose the respect which her magnanimous conduct at the beginning of the century had won for her among the nations of Europe, if she tamely suffered a people to which she was bound by so many ties to be destroyed piecemeal. England was now in a position, relatively to France, which might be compared to that in which France stood, relatively to Austria, after the battle of Sadowa. France then extended a generous and protecting hand, and saved Austria from ruin; so let England now act towards France. Lord Lyons promised to bring M. Jules Favre's observations under the notice of his Government, and after expressing the strong feeling of sympathy with France in her misfortunes by which he was personally animated, took his departure.

At the time of the formation of the new Government Jules Favre was honestly of opinion that the change in her representation would powerfully recommend the cause of France to the neutral Powers. The Emperor, he argued, made war upon personal or dynastic grounds; the Emperor is overthrown; the true France now makes her voice heard; declares that she would not have gone to war if she could have helped it; that her ideas all lie in the sphere of peace and the solidarity of peoples; and that the other Powers of Europe may safely make a collective representation to Prussia in order to bring about peace, because the Republic in France is a guarantee that no wanton aggression will ever be practised towards Germany hereafter. That this roseate view should commend itself to an ardent Republican was natural; but that his persuasion of the immaculate purity and peace-loving disposition of a French Republic should be shared in by other nations, and above all by Germany, was most improbable. The declarations of war of the French Convention, simply on the ground that the Governments attacked were hostile to the Rights of Man, are not yet forgotten. Count Bismark, though Jules Favre did not as yet know it, had already caused it to be understood that Germany held France, not the French Government for the time being, responsible for the declaration of war; and would not now grant peace till she had obtained guarantees for the future more solid than the supposed peaceful proclivities of a French Republic. In the interview held on the night of the 1st September, between himself and Moltke on the one hand, and Generals Wimpffen and Ducrot on the other, the Chancellor spoke as follows: -

" Our course is clear; France must be chastised for her pride and her aggressive and ambitious character. We desire, in short, to be able to insure the security of our children, and to that end there must be a direct line of demarcation between France and us. We must have a portion of territory, fortresses, and frontiers, which shall protect us for ever from any attack on her part."

Still, though England held back, might not France hope to be aided in her hour of need by one of the other Powers, or by a combination of them? M. Favre was firmly persuaded that both gratitude and interest ought to bring about a collective intervention on the part of the neutral Powers, which should force Prussia to negotiate for peace. Yet the grounds which he himself alleges for this persuasion are vague and inconclusive. The greatest among the neutral Powers "could not," he says, "open its annals without finding glorious instances of the devotedness of our chivalrous nation. All had enjoyed her hospitality, had found her generous, kindly, ready for any sacrifice, and seeking no recompense." Every word of this might be admitted, though not without qualifications; but what then? Admiration for the geniality and fertility of the French mind, recollection of cheering and stimulating hours passed within her borders, ought not to have blinded the neighbours of France to considerations of justice, nor to have induced them to shelter her altogether from the effects of the just resentment of Germany. That intervention was not resorted to later may be a legitimate subject of regret; but no neutral will be convinced by M. Favre's reasoning that it was the duty of his country to intervene immediately after the fall of the Empire.

Unless, indeed, there were some special pre-existing obligation, by which a particular nation might be bound, in gratitude and honour, to come to the assistance of France. Jules Favre thought that there were two nations thus situated - Austria and Italy. With regard to Austria, the frank and cordial explanations of Prince Metternich, who called at the Foreign Office soon after Lord Lyons, dispelled all expectation of aid in that quarter. Austria had been saved by French intervention after the battle of Koniggrätz; Prince Metternich did not think of denying this, nor of extenuating the claim to which such a service rendered his country amenable. He referred to some erroneous belief of the Duc de Gramont respecting words that had fallen from Count Beust. "It is not impossible," he said, "that M. Beust may have spoken of preparing 300,000 men if we were free to do so; but it is just this freedom which has always been denied us. The Emperor and his ministers will never brave the will of the Czar. Now the latter has threatened that if we were to declare ourselves for France, he would join Prussia. Our hands are therefore bound; but we will do nothing against you; wp will even aid you in everything that is reconcilable with our neutrality." These words clearly define the position of Austria at this time. She would willingly have aided France; but the Court of St. Petersburg, impelled by strong family and dynastic ties to sympathy with Prussia, had intimated that if Austria interfered for France, the sword of Russia would be thrown into the opposite scale.

Italy remained; could the nation which owed its very existence to France refuse to lend its aid to its benefactor in this time of peril? To the Italian Ambassador, who called after Prince Metternich, M. Favre used decided, almost peremptory, language. M. Nigra was embarrassed and sad; perhaps he was thinking of the return that the Italian Government were at that moment preparing to make for the generous aid of France, in the shape of the annexation of the Papal territory. He did not contradict one of Jules Favre's assertions, but only took his stand on the impossibility of isolated action on the part of Italy. She was ready to unite with other Powers, and even to lead them, if they would follow. But nothing was to be done without the support of England or Russia. Now the former obeyed the systematic indifference of Mr. Gladstone and the private inclinations of the Queen. The latter was the kind patron of Prussia, and would do nothing to thwart her.

The Chevalier Nigra, we see, alluded in language closely agreeing with that employed by Lord Lyons to the political effect of the natural prepossessions which the close connection of the English royal family with various royal and princely houses in Germany begets in the mind of an English sovereign, when Germany is at war. with any other Power. A general impression exists in England that no such political influence exists; that the policy of the country is shaped by the Ministry, who are themselves acted upon solely by Parliament and the press; but this impression is undoubtedly erroneous. There is good reason to believe that not the reluctance of Parliament, but the reluctance of the Court, induced Lord Palmerston to abandon the thought of giving material aid to Denmark in 1864.

These interviews opened the eyes of Jules Favre, and convinced him that France could hope for no armed intervention. She must trust to herself, and put forth her utmost energies to defend her capital, to kindle the flame of patriotism in the population, and to raise new armies in the place of those which had been lost. Meantime something might perhaps be hoped for from diplomatic intervention. But how her affairs sped under the new regime must be told in another chapter.